COMSOC-2008

Invited Papers



  • Individual and Group Strategy Proofness of Voting Rules: The Case for Restricted Domains

    • Salvador Barbera

  • Talk, Cheap Talk, and States of Knowledge

    • Rohit Parikh

  • Expressiveness in Mechanisms and its Relation to Efficiency

    • Tuomas Sandholm

  • Ranking, Trust, and Recommendation Systems: An Axiomatic Approach

    • Moshe Tennenholtz

  • Lorenz Rankings of Rules for the Adjudication of Conflicting Claims

    • William Thomson

    Contributed Papers



  • A Fair Payoff Distribution for Myopic Rational Agents

    • Stephane Airiau and Sandip Sen

  • Computing the Degree of Manipulability in the Case of Multiple Choice

    • Fuad Aleskerov, Daniel Karabekyan, Remzi Sanver, and Vyacheslav Yakuba

  • On the Complexity of Rationalizing Behavior

    • Jose Apesteguia and Miguel A. Ballester

  • Alternatives to Truthfulness are Hard to Recognize

    • Vincenzo Auletta, Paolo Penna, Giuseppe Persiano, and Carmine Ventre

  • Complexity of Comparison of Influence of Players in Simple Games

    • Haris Aziz

  • Divide and Conquer: False-Name Manipulations in Weighted Voting Games

    • Yoram Bachrach and Edith Elkind

  • Computing Kemeny Rankings, Parameterized by the Average KT-Distance

    • Nadja Betzler, Michael R. Fellows, Jiong Guo, Rolf Niedermeier, and Frances A. Rosamond

  • Three-sided Stable Matchings with Cyclic Preferences and the Kidney Exchange Problem

    • Peter Biro and Eric McDermid

  • Equilibria in Social Belief Removal

    • Richard Booth and Thomas Meyer

  • A Computational Analysis of the Tournament Equilibrium Set

    • Felix Brandt, Felix Fischer, Paul Harrenstein, and Maximilian Mair

  • Approximability of Manipulating Elections

    • Eric Brelsford, Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Henning Schnoor, and Ilka Schnoor

  • A Deontic Logic for Socially Optimal Norms

    • Jan Broersen, Rosja Mastop, John-Jules Ch. Meyer, and Paolo Turrini

  • Coalition Structures in Weighted Voting Games

    • Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind, and Nicholas R. Jennings

  • Compiling the Votes of a Subelectorate

    • Yann Chevaleyre, Jerome Lang, Nicolas Maudet, and Guillaume Ravilly-Abadie

  • Preference Functions That Score Rankings and Maximum Likelihood Estimation

    • Vincent Conitzer, Matthew Rognlie, and Lirong Xia

  • Computing Spanning Trees in a Social Choice Context

    • Andreas Darmann, Christian Klamler, and Ulrich Pferschy

  • Majority Voting on Restricted Domains: A Summary

    • Franz Dietrich and Christian List

  • Computing the Nucleolus of Weighted Voting Games

    • Edith Elkind and Dmitrii Pasechnik

  • Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control

    • Gabor Erdelyi, Markus Nowak, and Jorg Rothe}

  • Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Control

    • Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, and Jorg Rothe}

  • On Voting Caterpillars: Approximating Maximum Degree in a Tournament by Binary Trees

    • Felix Fischer, Ariel D. Procaccia, and Alex Samorodnitsky

  • From Preferences to Judgments and Back

    • Davide Grossi

  • Aggregating Referee Scores: An Algebraic Approach

    • Rolf Haenni

  • A Qualitative Vickrey Auction

    • Paul Harrenstein, Tamas Mahr, and Mathijs de Weerdt

  • How to Rig Elections and Competitions

    • Noam Hazon, Paul E. Dunne, Sarit Kraus, and Michael Wooldridge

  • A Geometric Approach to Judgment Aggregation

    • Christian Klamler and Daniel Eckert

  • Judgment Aggregation as Maximization of Epistemic and Social Utility

    • Szymon Klarman

  • Confluence Operators: Negotiation as Pointwise Merging

    • Sebastien Konieczny and Ramon Pino Perez

  • Welfare Properties of Argumentation-based Semantics

    • Kate Larson and Iyad Rahwan

  • Approval-rating Systems that never Reward Insincerity

    • Rob LeGrand and Ron K. Cytron

  • Dodgson's Rule: Approximations and Absurdity

    • John C. McCabe-Dansted

  • The Cost and Windfall of Manipulability

    • Abraham Othman and Tuomas Sandholm

  • Informational Requirements of Social Choice Rules

    • Shin Sato

  • Non-dictatorial Social Choice Rules are Safely Manipulable

    • Arkadii Slinko and Shaun White

  • On the Agenda Control Problem for Knockout Tournaments

    • Thuc Vu, Alon Altman, and Yoav Shoham

  • Complexity of Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation under Some Common Voting Rules

    • Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Ariel D. Procaccia, and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein