Proceedings of the COMSOC Workshop 2016

On Truthful Mechanisms for Maximin Share Allocations
Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas and Evangelos Markakis
[PDF File]

Optimal Reallocation under Additive and Ordinal Preferences
Haris Aziz, Peter Biro, Jérôme Lang, Julien Lesca and Jérôme Monnot
[PDF File]

Computing Pareto Optimal Committees
Haris Aziz, Jérôme Lang and Jérôme Monnot
[PDF File]

Misrepresentation in District Voting
Yoram Bachrach, Omer Lev, Yoad Lewenberg and Yair Zick
[PDF File]

Conditional and Sequential Approval Voting on Combinatorial Domains
Nathanaël Barrot and Jérôme Lang
[PDF File]

Automated Verification for Functional and Relational Properties of Voting Rules
Bernhard Beckert, Thorsten Bormer, Michael Kirsten, Till Neuber and Mattias Ulbrich
[PDF File]

Efficiency and Sequenceability in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods with Additive Preferences
Sylvain Bouveret and Michel Lemaître
[PDF File]

Proving the Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness via SMT Solving
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt and Christian Geist
[PDF File]

Analyzing the Practical Relevance of Voting Paradoxes via Ehrhart Theory, Computer Simulations, and Empirical Data
Felix Brandt, Christian Geist and Martin Strobel
[PDF File]

And the winner is ... Chevalier de Borda: Neural networks vote according to Borda's Rule
Dávid Burka, Clemens Puppe, László Szepesváry and Attila Tasnadi
[PDF File]

How effective can simple ordinal peer grading be?
Ioannis Caragiannis, George Krimpas and Alexandros Voudouris
[PDF File]

Fairness in voting: the tale of Blotto's lieutenants
Alessandra Casella, Jean-Francois Laslier and Antonin Macé
[PDF File]

Pareto optimal matchings with lower quotas
Katarina Cechlarova and Tamás Fleiner
[PDF File]

Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites
Katarina Cechlarova, Bettina Klaus and David Manlove
[PDF File]

The one-dimensional Euclidean preferences: Finitely many forbidden substructures are not enough
Jiehua Chen, Kirk Pruhs and Gerhard J. Woeginger
[PDF File]

Rules for Choosing Societal Tradeoffs
Vincent Conitzer, Rupert Freeman, Markus Brill and Yuqian Li
[PDF File]

Proportional Borda Allocations
Andreas Darmann and Christian Klamler
[PDF File]

Natural Interviewing Equilibria for Stable Matching
Joanna Drummond, Allan Borodin and Kate Larson
[PDF File]

Structure in Dichotomous Preferences
Edith Elkind and Martin Lackner
[PDF File]

Committee Scoring Rules
Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko and Nimrod Talmon
[PDF File]

On Voting and Facility Location
Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Iddan Golomb
[PDF File]

Object allocation problems under constraints
Laurent Gourves, Carlos Martinhon and Jérôme Monnot
[PDF File]

Parameterized Complexity Results for the Kemeny Rule in Judgment Aggregation
Ronald de Haan
[PDF File]

Divide and Conquer: Using Geographic Manipulation to Win District-Based Elections
Yoad Lewenberg and Omer Lev
[PDF File]

Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting
Reshef Meir
[PDF File]

Ordinal power relations and social rankings
Stefano Moretti and Meltem Ozturk
[PDF File]

Strategy-Proofness of Scoring Allocation Correspondences
Nhan-Tam Nguyen, Dorothea Baumeister and Jörg Rothe
[PDF File]

Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
Matias Nunez and Marcus Pivato
[PDF File]

Recognising Multidimensional Euclidean Preferences
Dominik Peters
[PDF File]

The Single-Peaked Domain Revisited: A Simple Global Characterization
Clemens Puppe
[PDF File]

Condorcet Domains and Median Graphs
Clemens Puppe and Arkadii Slinko
[PDF File]

Axiomatic Characterization of Committee Scoring Rules
Piotr Skowron, Piotr Faliszewski and Arkadii Slinko
[PDF File]

Bayesian Estimators As Voting Rules
Lirong Xia
[PDF File]

How Hard Is It to Control a Group?
Yongjie Yang and Dinko Dimitrov
[PDF File]

Cycles and Intractability in Social Choice Theory
William Zwicker
[PDF File]

Verification in Incomplete Argumentation Frameworks
Dorothea Baumeister, Daniel Neugebauer, Jörg Rothe and Hilmar Schadrack
[PDF File]

Incremental Approval Voting for Multi-agent Knapsack Problems
Nawal Benabbou and Patrice Perny
[PDF File]

Majority Graphs of Assignment Problems and Properties of Popular Random Assignments
Felix Brandt, Johannes Hofbauer and Martin Suderland
[PDF File]

Arguing about Voting Rules
Olivier Cailloux and Ulle Endriss
[PDF File]

Borda, Condorcet, and Pareto optimality in ordinal group activity selection
Andreas Darmann
[PDF File]

Equilibria of Plurality Voting: Lazy and Truth-biased Voters
Edith Elkind, Evangelos Markakis, Svetlana Obraztsova and Piotr Skowron
[PDF File]

Complexity of Manipulative Actions When Voting with Ties
Zack Fitzsimmons and Edith Hemaspaandra
[PDF File]

Fair Social Choice in Dynamic Settings
Rupert Freeman, Seyed Majid Zahedi and Vincent Conitzer
[PDF File]

The Random Pairs Voting Rule: Introduction and Evaluation With a Large Dataset
Jeremy Hansen
[PDF File]

Edge-Compressed Majority Graph: Where Social Choice Meets Information Visualization
Nikos Karanikolas, Renaud Blanch and Sylvain Bouveret
[PDF File]

Who Can Win a Single-Elimination Tournament?
Michael P. Kim, Warut Suksompong and Virginia Vassilevska Williams
[PDF File]

Refinement and randomised versions of some tournament solutions
Justin Kruger, Stéphane Airiau and Jérôme Lang
[PDF File]

Agenda Separability in Judgment Aggregation
--color-background-verylight Lang, Marija Slavkovik and Srdjan Vesic
[PDF File]

Bounds on Manipulation by Merging in Weighted Voting Games
Ramoni Lasisi and Abibat Lasisi
[PDF File]

Analyzing games with ambiguous types using the MINthenMAX decision model
Ilan Nehama
[PDF File]

Altruistic Hedonic Games
Nhan-Tam Nguyen, Anja Rey, Lisa Rey, Jörg Rothe and Lena Schend
[PDF File]

Doodle Poll Games
Svetlana Obraztsova, Maria Polukarov, Zinovi Rabinovich and Edith Elkind
[PDF File]

Single-peakedness Based on the Net Preference Matrix: Characterization and Algorithms
Olivier Spanjaard and Paul Weng
[PDF File]

A Majoritarian Representative Voting System
Pietro Speroni di Fenizio and Daniele A. Gewurz
[PDF File]

Learning Mixtures of Plackett-Luce models
Zhibing Zhao, Peter Piech and Lirong Xia
[PDF File]