Accepted Papers

The programme committee has selected 19 contributions for presentation at the workshop:

• Pareto Optimality in Coalition Formation
  Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt and Paul Harrenstein
• Probabilistic and Utility-theoretic Models in Social Choice: Challenges for Learning, Optimization, Elicitation, and Manipulation
  Craig Boutilier and Tyler Lu
• Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Strategyproofness of Irresolute Social Choice Functions
  Felix Brandt and Markus Brill
• Fairness and Welfare in Division of Goods When Utility is Transferable
  Ruggiero Cavallo
• Dominating Manipulations in Voting with Partial Information
  Vincent Conitzer, Toby Walsh and Lirong Xia
• Randomised Room Assignment-Rent Division
  Lachlan Dufton and Kate Larson
• Reassignment-Based Strategy-Proof Mechanism for Interdependent Task Allocation with Private Costs and Execution Failures
  Ayman Ghoneim and Jussi Rintanen
• Compact Representation Scheme of Coalitional Games Based on Multi-terminal Zero-suppressed Binary Decision Diagrams
  Ryo Ichimura, Yuko Sakurai, Suguru Ueda, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo and Shin-Ichi Minato
• A Liberal Impossibility of Abstract Argumentation
  Nan Li
• Fair Division of Indivisible Goods under Risk
  Charles Lumet, Sylvain Bouveret and Michel Lemaître
• Influencing and Aggregating Agents' Preferences over Combinatorial Domains
  Nicolas Maudet, Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi and K. Brent Venable
• Manipulation of Nanson's and Baldwin's Rules
  Nina Narodytska, Toby Walsh and Lirong Xia
• Voting Power, Hierarchical Pivotal Sets, and Random Dictatorships
  David Pennock and Lirong Xia
• Weights in Stable Marriage Problems Increase Manipulation Opportunities
  Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi, K. Brent Venable and Toby Walsh
• Manipulating Single-Elimination Tournaments in the Braverman-Mossel Model
  Isabelle Stanton and Virginia Vassilevska Williams
• Distance-based Judgment Aggregation of Three-valued Judgments with Weights
  Marija Slavkovik and Wojtek Jamroga
• Venetian Elections and Lot-based Voting Rules
  Toby Walsh and Lirong Xia
• Possible Winners in Noisy Elections
  Krzysztof Wojtas and Piotr Faliszewski
• Consensus Action Games
  Julian Zappala, Natasha Alechina and Brian Logan