Programme

Each paper has been allocated 20 minutes for presentation, including a few minutes for questions and discussion.

9:00-11:00:  Welcome & Session 1: Coalitional Games / Mechanism Design   (Chair: Edith Elkind)

Pareto Optimality in Coalition Formation Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt and Paul Harrenstein Compact Representation Scheme of Coalitional Games Based on Multi-terminal Zero-suppressed Binary Decision Diagrams Ryo Ichimura, Yuko Sakurai, Suguru Ueda, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo and Shin-Ichi Minato Consensus Action Games Julian Zappala, Natasha Alechina and Brian Logan Voting Power, Hierarchical Pivotal Sets, and Random Dictatorships David Pennock and Lirong Xia Reassignment-Based Strategy-Proof Mechanism for Interdependent Task Allocation with Private Costs and Execution Failures Ayman Ghoneim and Jussi Rintanen

11:00-11:30:  Coffee Break

11:30-13:00:  Session 2: Matching / Fair Division   (Chair: Jérôme Lang)

Weights in Stable Marriage Problems Increase Manipulation Opportunities Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi, K. Brent Venable and Toby Walsh Randomised Room Assignment-Rent Division Lachlan Dufton and Kate Larson Fairness and Welfare in Division of Goods When Utility is Transferable Ruggiero Cavallo Fair Division of Indivisible Goods under Risk Charles Lumet, Sylvain Bouveret and Michel Lemaître

13:00-14:30:  Lunch Break

14:30-16:30:  Session 3: Judgment Aggregation / Incomplete Information   (Chair: Ulle Endriss)

Distance-based Judgment Aggregation of Three-valued Judgments with Weights Marija Slavkovik and Wojtek Jamroga A Liberal Impossibility of Abstract Argumentation Nan Li Possible Winners in Noisy Elections Krzysztof Wojtas and Piotr Faliszewski Influencing and Aggregating Agents' Preferences over Combinatorial Domains Nicolas Maudet, Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi and K. Brent Venable Probabilistic and Utility-theoretic Models in Social Choice: Challenges for Learning, Optimization, Elicitation, and Manipulation Craig Boutilier and Tyler Lu Dominating Manipulations in Voting with Partial Information Vincent Conitzer, Toby Walsh and Lirong Xia

16:30-17:00:  Coffee Break

17:00-18:30:  Session 4: Manipulation   (Chair: Piotr Faliszewski)

Manipulating Single-Elimination Tournaments in the Braverman-Mossel Model Isabelle Stanton and Virginia Vassilevska Williams Manipulation of Nanson's and Baldwin's Rules Nina Narodytska, Toby Walsh and Lirong Xia Venetian Elections and Lot-based Voting Rules Toby Walsh and Lirong Xia Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Strategyproofness of Irresolute Social Choice Functions Felix Brandt and Markus Brill