2nd International Workshop on Computational Social Choice
Liverpool, 3-5 September 2008

COMSOC-2008 Accepted papers

Click on a title to see the abstract; clicking again toggles it off. (This facility was borrowed from Mihai Pătraşcu's publications page.)

Complexity of comparison of influence of players in simple games
On the Complexity of Rationalizing Behavior
The Cost and Windfall of Manipulability
On Voting Caterpillars: Approximating Maximum Degree in a Tournament by Binary Trees
Coalition Structures in Weighted Voting Games
Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind and Nick Jennings
A Deontic Logic for Socially Optimal Norms
How to Rig Elections and Competitions
Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Control
Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra and Jörg Rothe
Welfare properties of argumentation-based semantics
Kate Larson and Iyad Rahwan
Approval-rating systems that never reward insincerity
Extending the Theorem of Gibbard and Satterthwaite
Arkadii Slinko and Shaun White
Equilibria in Social Belief Removal
Richard Booth and Thomas Meyer
Dodgson's Rule: Approximations and Absurdity
Informational requirements of social choice rules
Shin Sato
A Computational Analysis of the Tournament Equilibrium Set
Felix Brandt, Felix Fischer, Paul Harrenstein and Maximilian Mair.
Computing the Degree of Manipulability in the Case of Multiple Choice
Fuad Aleskerov, Daniel Karabekyan, Remzi Sanver and Vyacheslav Yakuba
Negotiation as Pointwise Merging
S´┐Żbastien Konieczny and Ramon Pino Perez
Complexity of Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation Under Some Common Voting Rules
Divide and Conquer: False-Name Manipulations in Weighted Voting Games
Edith Elkind and Yoram Bachrach.
A fair payoff distribution for myopic rational agents
Stéphane Airiau and Sandip Sen
A geometric approach to judgment aggregation
Christian Klamler and Daniel Eckert
A Qualitative Vickrey Auction
Three-sided stable matchings with cyclic preferences and the kidney exchange problem
Compiling the votes of a subelectorate
Yann Chevaleyre, Jérôme Lang, Nicolas Maudet and Guillaume Ravilly-Abadie
Approximability of Manipulating Elections
Eric Brelsford, Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Henning Schnoor and Ilka Schnoor
Alternatives to Truthfulness are Hard to Recognize
Computing Spanning Trees in a Social Choice Context
Andreas Darmann, Christian Klamler and Ulrich Pferschy
Computing Kemeny Rankings, Parameterized by the Average KT-Distance
Nadja Betzler, Michael Fellows, Jiong Guo, Rolf Niedermeier and Frances A. Rosamond
Judgment Aggregation as Maximization of Epistemic and Social Utility
Szymon Klarman
Aggregating Referee Scores: an Algebraic Approach
From Preferences to Judgments and Back
Davide Grossi
Computing the nucleolus of weighted voting games
Dmitrii Pasechnik and Edith Elkind
Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
Gabor Erdelyi, Markus Nowak and Jörg Rothe
Social Welfare Functions That Score Rankings and Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Vincent Conitzer, Matthew Rognlie and Lirong Xia
On the Agenda Control Problem for Knockout Tournaments
Thuc Vu, Alon Altman and Yoav Shoham
Majority voting on restricted domains: a summary