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Accepted Papers
The accepted papers are:
- Cycles and Intractability in Social Choice Theory
William Zwicker
- Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites
Katarina Cechlarova, Bettina Klaus and David Manlove
- Who Can Win a Single-Elimination Tournament?
Michael P. Kim, Warut Suksompong and Virginia Vassilevska Williams
- Fairness in voting: the tale of Blotto's lieutenants
Alessandra Casella, Jean-Francois Laslier and Antonin Macé
- Proving the Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness via SMT Solving
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt and Christian Geist
- Agenda Separability in Judgment Aggregation
Jérôme Lang, Marija Slavkovik and Srdjan Vesic
- Arguing about Voting Rules
Olivier Cailloux and Ulle Endriss
- Parameterized Complexity Results for the Kemeny Rule in Judgment Aggregation
Ronald de Haan
- On Voting and Facility Location
Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Iddan Golomb
- Bounds on Manipulation by Merging in Weighted Voting Games
Ramoni Lasisi and Abibat Lasisi
- Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting
Reshef Meir
- Ordinal power relations and social rankings
Stefano Moretti and Meltem Ozturk
- Analyzing games with ambiguous types using the MINthenMAX decision model
Ilan Nehama
- Parameterized Complexity of Group Activity Selection Problem and Stable Invitations Problem
Hooyeon Lee and Virginia Vassilevska Williams
- Rules for Choosing Societal Tradeoffs
Vincent Conitzer, Rupert Freeman, Markus Brill and Yuqian Li
- Fair Social Choice in Dynamic Settings
Rupert Freeman, Seyed Majid Zahedi and Vincent Conitzer
- Computing Pareto Optimal Committees
Haris Aziz, Jérôme Lang and Jerome Monnot
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