Accepted Papers

The accepted papers are:

• Cycles and Intractability in Social Choice Theory
  William Zwicker
• Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites
  Katarina Cechlarova, Bettina Klaus and David Manlove
• Who Can Win a Single-Elimination Tournament?
  Michael P. Kim, Warut Suksompong and Virginia Vassilevska Williams
• Fairness in voting: the tale of Blotto's lieutenants
  Alessandra Casella, Jean-Francois Laslier and Antonin Macé
• Proving the Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness via SMT Solving
  Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt and Christian Geist
• Agenda Separability in Judgment Aggregation
  Jerome Lang, Marija Slavkovik and Srdjan Vesic
• Arguing about Voting Rules
  Olivier Cailloux and Ulle Endriss
• Parameterized Complexity Results for the Kemeny Rule in Judgment Aggregation
  Ronald de Haan
• On Voting and Facility Location
  Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Iddan Golomb
• Bounds on Manipulation by Merging in Weighted Voting Games
  Ramoni Lasisi and Abibat Lasisi
• Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting
  Reshef Meir
• Ordinal power relations and social rankings
  Stefano Moretti and Meltem Ozturk
• Analyzing games with ambiguous types using the MINthenMAX decision model
  Ilan Nehama
• Rules for Choosing Societal Tradeoffs
  Vincent Conitzer, Rupert Freeman, Markus Brill and Yuqian Li
• Condorcet Domains and Median Graphs
  Clemens Puppe and Arkadii Slinko
• Fair Social Choice in Dynamic Settings
  Rupert Freeman, Seyed Majid Zahedi and Vincent Conitzer
• Computing Pareto Optimal Committees
  Haris Aziz, Jerome Lang and Jerome Monnot
• Altruistic Hedonic Games
  Nhan-Tam Nguyen, Anja Rey, Lisa Rey, Jorg Rothe and Lena Schend
• Verification in Incomplete Argumentation Frameworks
  Dorothea Baumeister, Daniel Neugebauer, Jorg Rothe and Hilmar Schadrack
• Natural Interviewing Equilibria for Stable Matching
  Joanna Drummond, Allan Borodin and Kate Larson
• Strategy-Proofness of Scoring Allocation Correspondences
  Nhan-Tam Nguyen, Dorothea Baumeister and Jorg Rothe
• Single-peakedness Based on the Net Preference Matrix: Characterization and Algorithms
  Olivier Spanjaard and Paul Weng
• Pareto optimal matchings with lower quotas
  Katarina Cechlarova and Tamás Fleiner
• Bayesian Estimators As Voting Rules
  Lirong Xia
• The Single-Peaked Domain Revisited: A Simple Global Characterization
  Clemens Puppe
• Learning Mixtures of Plackett-Luce models
  Zhibing Zhao, Peter Piech and Lirong Xia
• Misrepresentation in District Voting
  Yoram Bachrach, Omer Lev, Yoad Lewenberg and Yair Zick
• Divide and Conquer: Using Geographic Manipulation to Win District-Based Elections
  Yoad Lewenberg and Omer Lev
• How effective can simple ordinal peer grading be?
  Ioannis Caragiannis, George Krimpas and Alexandros Voudouris
• Recognising Multidimensional Euclidean Preferences
  Dominik Peters
• How Hard Is It to Control a Group?
  Yongjie Yang and Dinko Dimitrov
• Efficiency and Sequenceability in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods with Additive Preferences
  Sylvain Bouveret and Michel Lemaître
• Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
  Matias Nunez and Marcus Pivato
• On Truthful Mechanisms for Maximin Share Allocations
  Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas and Evangelos Markakis
• Object allocation problems under constraints
  Laurent Gourves, Carlos Martinhon and Jerome Monnot
• Conditional and Sequential Approval Voting on Combinatorial Domains
  Nathanaël Barrot and Jerome Lang
• A Majoritarian Representative Voting System
  Pietro Speroni di Fenizio and Daniele A. Gewurz
• Structure in Dichotomous Preferences
  Edith Elkind and Martin Lackner
• Borda, Condorcet, and Pareto optimality in ordinal group activity selection
  Andreas Darmann
• Proportional Borda Allocations
  Andreas Darmann and Christian Klamler
• Majority Graphs of Assignment Problems and Properties of Popular Random Assignments
  Felix Brandt, Johannes Hofbauer and Martin Suderland
• Optimal Reallocation under Additive and Ordinal Preferences
  Haris Aziz, Peter Biro, Jerome Lang, Julien Lesca and Jerome Monnot
• Committee Scoring Rules
  Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko and Nimrod Talmon
• Analyzing the Practical Relevance of Voting Paradoxes via Ehrhart Theory, Computer Simulations, and Empirical Data
  Felix Brandt, Christian Geist and Martin Strobel
• The one-dimensional Euclidean preferences: Finitely many forbidden substructures are not enough
  Jiehua Chen, Kirk Pruhs and Gerhard J. Woeginger
• And the winner is ... Chevalier de Borda: Neural networks vote according to Borda's Rule
  Dávid Burka, Clemens Puppe, László Szepesváry and Attila Tasnadi
• Axiomatic Characterization of Committee Scoring Rules
  Piotr Skowron, Piotr Faliszewski and Arkadii Slinko
• Incremental Approval Voting for Multi-agent Knapsack Problems
  Nawal Benabbou and Patrice Perny
• Edge-Compressed Majority Graph: Where Social Choice Meets Information Visualization
  Nikos Karanikolas, Renaud Blanch and Sylvain Bouveret
• Doodle Poll Games
  Svetlana Obraztsova, Maria Polukarov, Zinovi Rabinovich and Edith Elkind
• Automated Verification for Functional and Relational Properties of Voting Rules
  Bernhard Beckert, Thorsten Bormer, Michael Kirsten, Till Neuber and Mattias Ulbrich
• Complexity of Manipulative Actions When Voting with Ties
  Zack Fitzsimmons and Edith Hemaspaandra
• The Random Pairs Voting Rule: Introduction and Evaluation With a Large Dataset
  Jeremy Hansen
• Equilibria of Plurality Voting: Lazy and Truth-biased Voters
  Edith Elkind, Evangelos Markakis, Svetlana Obraztsova and Piotr Skowron
• Refinement and randomised versions of some tournament solutions
  Justin Kruger, Stéphane Airiau and Jérôme Lang