Accepted Papers

The programme committee has received 48 submissions and accepted 38 of these for presentation at the workshop. A full programme will be available soon. Here are the accepted papers in no particular order:

• John Christopher McCabe-Dansted, Geoffrey Pritchard and Arkadii Slinko
  Approximability of Dodgson's Rule
• Robin Christian, Mike Fellows, Frances Rosamond and Arkadii Slinko
  On Complexity of Lobbying in Multiple Referenda
• Wlodzimierz Ogryczak
  Bicriteria Models for Fair Resource Allocation
• Keith Dougherty and Julian Edward
  The Probability of Sen's Liberal Paradox
• Valentin Robu and Han La Poutré
  Retrieving the Structure of Utility Graphs Used in Multi-Item Negotiation through Collaborative Filtering
• Ariel Procaccia, Aviv Zohar and Jeffrey Rosenschein
  Automated Design of Voting Rules by Learning from Examples
• Marco Dall'Aglio and Raffaele Mosca
  How to Allocate Hard Candies Fairly
• Koji Takamiya
  Domains of Social Choice Functions on which Coalition Strategy-proofness and Maskin Monotonicity are Equivalent
• Jörg Rothe and Holger Spakowski
  On Determining Dodgson Winners by Frequently Self-Knowingly Correct Algorithms and in Average-Case Polynomial Time
• Johann Mitlöhner, Daniel Eckert and Christian Klamler
  Simulating the Effects of Misperception on the Manipulability of Voting Rules
• Nicola Friederike Maaser and Stefan Napel
  Equal Representation in Two-tier Voting Systems
• Massimo Narizzano, Luca Pulina and Armando Tacchella
  Voting Systems and Automated Reasoning: The QBF Evaluation Case Study
• Ariel Procaccia, Jeffrey Rosenschein and Gal Kaminka
  On the Robustness of Preference Aggregation in Noisy Environments
• Felix Brandt, Felix Fischer and Paul Harrenstein
  The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets
• Christopher Homan and Lane A. Hemaspaandra
  Guarantees for the Success Frequency of an Algorithm for Finding Dodgson-Election Winners
• Krzysztof R. Apt and Andreas Witzel
  A Generic Approach to Coalition Formation
• Michael Trick
  Small Binary Voting Trees
• Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra and Jörg Rothe
  Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
• Igor Douven and Jan-Willem Romeijn
  The Discursive Dilemma as a Lottery Paradox
• Gabriella Pigozzi and Stephan Hartmann
  Merging Judgments and the Problem of Truth-Tracking
• Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra and Lane A. Hemaspaandra
  The Complexity of Bribery in Elections
• Sylvain Bouveret and Michel Lemaître
  Finding Leximin-Optimal Solutions using Constraint Programming: New Algorithms and their Application to Combinatorial Auctions
• Edith Elkind and Helger Lipmaa
  Hybrid Voting Protocols and Hardness of Manipulation
• Claus Beisbart and Stephan Hartmann
  Welfarism and the Assessments of Social Decision Rules
• Eric Pacuit, Rohit Parikh and Samer Salame
  Some Results on Adjusted Winner
• Yann Chevaleyre and Nicolas Maudet
  Natural Rules for Optimal Debates: Preliminaries for a Combinatorial Exploration
• Stefan Maus, Hans Peters and Ton Storcken
  Anonymous Voting and Minimal Manipulability
• Boi Faltings, David Parkes, Adrian Petcu and Jeff Shneidman
  Optimizing Streaming Applications with Self-Interested Users using MDPOP
• Tijmen Daniëls
  Social Choice and the Logic of Simple Games
• John Wicks and Amy Greenwald
  QuickRank: A Recursive Ranking Algorithm
• Rob LeGrand, Evangelos Markakis and Aranyak Mehta
  Approval Voting: Local Search Heuristics and Approximation Algorithms for the Minimax Solution
• Vincent Conitzer
  Eliciting Single-Peaked Preferences Using Comparison Queries
• Vjollca Sadiraj, Jan Tuinstra and Frans van Winden
  Voting Cycles in a Computational Electoral Competition Model with Endogenous Interest Groups
• Paul-Amaury Matt, Francesca Toni and Dionysis Dionysiou
  The Distributed Negotiation of Egalitarian Allocations
• Rudolf Müller, Andrés Perea and Sascha Wolf
  Weak Monotonicity and Bayes-Nash Incentive Compatibility
• Birgit Heydenreich, Rudolf Müller and Marc Uetz
  Decentralization and Mechanism Design for Online Machine Scheduling
• Christian List and Franz Dietrich
  Judgment Aggregation without Full Rationality
• Thomas Ågotnes, Wiebe van der Hoek and Michael Wooldridge
  Towards a Logic of Social Welfare