1st International Workshop on Computational Social Choice
Amsterdam, 6-8 December 2006

Accepted Papers

The programme committee has received 48 submissions and accepted 38 of these for presentation at the workshop. A full programme will be available soon. Here are the accepted papers in no particular order:

  • John Christopher McCabe-Dansted, Geoffrey Pritchard and Arkadii Slinko
    Approximability of Dodgson's Rule
  • Robin Christian, Mike Fellows, Frances Rosamond and Arkadii Slinko
    On Complexity of Lobbying in Multiple Referenda
  • Wlodzimierz Ogryczak
    Bicriteria Models for Fair Resource Allocation
  • Keith Dougherty and Julian Edward
    The Probability of Sen's Liberal Paradox
  • Valentin Robu and Han La Poutré
    Retrieving the Structure of Utility Graphs Used in Multi-Item Negotiation through Collaborative Filtering
  • Ariel Procaccia, Aviv Zohar and Jeffrey Rosenschein
    Automated Design of Voting Rules by Learning from Examples
  • Marco Dall'Aglio and Raffaele Mosca
    How to Allocate Hard Candies Fairly
  • Koji Takamiya
    Domains of Social Choice Functions on which Coalition Strategy-proofness and Maskin Monotonicity are Equivalent
  • Jörg Rothe and Holger Spakowski
    On Determining Dodgson Winners by Frequently Self-Knowingly Correct Algorithms and in Average-Case Polynomial Time
  • Johann Mitlöhner, Daniel Eckert and Christian Klamler
    Simulating the Effects of Misperception on the Manipulability of Voting Rules
  • Nicola Friederike Maaser and Stefan Napel
    Equal Representation in Two-tier Voting Systems
  • Massimo Narizzano, Luca Pulina and Armando Tacchella
    Voting Systems and Automated Reasoning: The QBF Evaluation Case Study
  • Ariel Procaccia, Jeffrey Rosenschein and Gal Kaminka
    On the Robustness of Preference Aggregation in Noisy Environments
  • Felix Brandt, Felix Fischer and Paul Harrenstein
    The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets
  • Christopher Homan and Lane A. Hemaspaandra
    Guarantees for the Success Frequency of an Algorithm for Finding Dodgson-Election Winners
  • Krzysztof R. Apt and Andreas Witzel
    A Generic Approach to Coalition Formation
  • Michael Trick
    Small Binary Voting Trees
  • Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra and Jörg Rothe
    Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
  • Igor Douven and Jan-Willem Romeijn
    The Discursive Dilemma as a Lottery Paradox
  • Gabriella Pigozzi and Stephan Hartmann
    Merging Judgments and the Problem of Truth-Tracking
  • Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra and Lane A. Hemaspaandra
    The Complexity of Bribery in Elections
  • Sylvain Bouveret and Michel Lemaître
    Finding Leximin-Optimal Solutions using Constraint Programming: New Algorithms and their Application to Combinatorial Auctions
  • Edith Elkind and Helger Lipmaa
    Hybrid Voting Protocols and Hardness of Manipulation
  • Claus Beisbart and Stephan Hartmann
    Welfarism and the Assessments of Social Decision Rules
  • Eric Pacuit, Rohit Parikh and Samer Salame
    Some Results on Adjusted Winner
  • Yann Chevaleyre and Nicolas Maudet
    Natural Rules for Optimal Debates: Preliminaries for a Combinatorial Exploration
  • Stefan Maus, Hans Peters and Ton Storcken
    Anonymous Voting and Minimal Manipulability
  • Boi Faltings, David Parkes, Adrian Petcu and Jeff Shneidman
    Optimizing Streaming Applications with Self-Interested Users using MDPOP
  • Tijmen Daniëls
    Social Choice and the Logic of Simple Games
  • John Wicks and Amy Greenwald
    QuickRank: A Recursive Ranking Algorithm
  • Rob LeGrand, Evangelos Markakis and Aranyak Mehta
    Approval Voting: Local Search Heuristics and Approximation Algorithms for the Minimax Solution
  • Vincent Conitzer
    Eliciting Single-Peaked Preferences Using Comparison Queries
  • Vjollca Sadiraj, Jan Tuinstra and Frans van Winden
    Voting Cycles in a Computational Electoral Competition Model with Endogenous Interest Groups
  • Paul-Amaury Matt, Francesca Toni and Dionysis Dionysiou
    The Distributed Negotiation of Egalitarian Allocations
  • Rudolf Müller, Andrés Perea and Sascha Wolf
    Weak Monotonicity and Bayes-Nash Incentive Compatibility
  • Birgit Heydenreich, Rudolf Müller and Marc Uetz
    Decentralization and Mechanism Design for Online Machine Scheduling
  • Christian List and Franz Dietrich
    Judgment Aggregation without Full Rationality
  • Thomas Ågotnes, Wiebe van der Hoek and Michael Wooldridge
    Towards a Logic of Social Welfare