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Accepted Papers
The programme committee has received 48 submissions and accepted 38
of these for presentation at the workshop. A full programme will be
available soon. Here are the accepted papers in no particular order:
- John Christopher McCabe-Dansted, Geoffrey Pritchard and Arkadii Slinko
Approximability of Dodgson's Rule
- Robin Christian, Mike Fellows, Frances Rosamond and Arkadii Slinko
On Complexity of Lobbying in Multiple Referenda
- Wlodzimierz Ogryczak
Bicriteria Models for Fair Resource Allocation
- Keith Dougherty and Julian Edward
The Probability of Sen's Liberal Paradox
- Valentin Robu and Han La Poutré
Retrieving the Structure of Utility Graphs Used in Multi-Item Negotiation through Collaborative Filtering
- Ariel Procaccia, Aviv Zohar and Jeffrey Rosenschein
Automated Design of Voting Rules by Learning from Examples
- Marco Dall'Aglio and Raffaele Mosca
How to Allocate Hard Candies Fairly
- Koji Takamiya
Domains of Social Choice Functions on which Coalition Strategy-proofness and Maskin Monotonicity are Equivalent
- Jörg Rothe and Holger Spakowski
On Determining Dodgson Winners by Frequently Self-Knowingly Correct Algorithms and in Average-Case Polynomial Time
- Johann Mitlöhner, Daniel Eckert and Christian Klamler
Simulating the Effects of Misperception on the Manipulability of Voting Rules
- Nicola Friederike Maaser and Stefan Napel
Equal Representation in Two-tier Voting Systems
- Massimo Narizzano, Luca Pulina and Armando Tacchella
Voting Systems and Automated Reasoning: The QBF Evaluation Case Study
- Ariel Procaccia, Jeffrey Rosenschein and Gal Kaminka
On the Robustness of Preference Aggregation in Noisy Environments
- Felix Brandt, Felix Fischer and Paul Harrenstein
The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets
- Christopher Homan and Lane A. Hemaspaandra
Guarantees for the Success Frequency of an Algorithm for Finding Dodgson-Election Winners
- Krzysztof R. Apt and Andreas Witzel
A Generic Approach to Coalition Formation
- Michael Trick
Small Binary Voting Trees
- Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra and Jörg Rothe
Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
- Igor Douven and Jan-Willem Romeijn
The Discursive Dilemma as a Lottery Paradox
- Gabriella Pigozzi and Stephan Hartmann
Merging Judgments and the Problem of Truth-Tracking
- Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra and Lane A. Hemaspaandra
The Complexity of Bribery in Elections
- Sylvain Bouveret and Michel Lemaître
Finding Leximin-Optimal Solutions using Constraint Programming: New Algorithms and their Application to Combinatorial Auctions
- Edith Elkind and Helger Lipmaa
Hybrid Voting Protocols and Hardness of Manipulation
- Claus Beisbart and Stephan Hartmann
Welfarism and the Assessments of Social Decision Rules
- Eric Pacuit, Rohit Parikh and Samer Salame
Some Results on Adjusted Winner
- Yann Chevaleyre and Nicolas Maudet
Natural Rules for Optimal Debates: Preliminaries for a Combinatorial Exploration
- Stefan Maus, Hans Peters and Ton Storcken
Anonymous Voting and Minimal Manipulability
- Boi Faltings, David Parkes, Adrian Petcu and Jeff Shneidman
Optimizing Streaming Applications with Self-Interested Users using MDPOP
- Tijmen Daniëls
Social Choice and the Logic of Simple Games
- John Wicks and Amy Greenwald
QuickRank: A Recursive Ranking Algorithm
- Rob LeGrand, Evangelos Markakis and Aranyak Mehta
Approval Voting: Local Search Heuristics and Approximation Algorithms for the Minimax Solution
- Vincent Conitzer
Eliciting Single-Peaked Preferences Using Comparison Queries
- Vjollca Sadiraj, Jan Tuinstra and Frans van Winden
Voting Cycles in a Computational Electoral Competition Model with Endogenous Interest Groups
- Paul-Amaury Matt, Francesca Toni and Dionysis Dionysiou
The Distributed Negotiation of Egalitarian Allocations
- Rudolf Müller, Andrés Perea and Sascha Wolf
Weak Monotonicity and Bayes-Nash Incentive Compatibility
- Birgit Heydenreich, Rudolf Müller and Marc Uetz
Decentralization and Mechanism Design for Online Machine Scheduling
- Christian List and Franz Dietrich
Judgment Aggregation without Full Rationality
- Thomas Ågotnes, Wiebe van der Hoek and Michael Wooldridge
Towards a Logic of Social Welfare
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