COMSOC-2008 Accepted papers

Haris Aziz. Complexity of comparison of influence of players in simple games
Jose Apesteguia and Miguel A. Ballester. On the Complexity of Rationalizing Behavior
Abraham Othman and Tuomas Sandholm. The Cost and Windfall of Manipulability
Felix Fischer, Ariel Procaccia and Alex Samorodnitsky. On Voting Caterpillars: Approximating Maximum Degree in a Tournament by Binary Trees
Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind and Nick Jennings. Coalition Structures in Weighted Voting Games
Jan Broersen, Rosja Mastop, John-Jules Meyer and Paolo Turrini. A Deontic Logic for Socially Optimal Norms
Noam Hazon, Paul E. Dunne, Sarit Kraus and Michael Wooldridge. How to Rig Elections and Competitions
Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra and Jörg Rothe. Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Control
Kate Larson and Iyad Rahwan. Welfare properties of argumentation-based semantics
Rob LeGrand and Ron K. Cytron. Approval-rating systems that never reward insincerity
Arkadii Slinko and Shaun White. Extending the Theorem of Gibbard and Satterthwaite
Richard Booth and Thomas Meyer. Equilibria in Social Belief Removal
John McCabe-Dansted. Dodgson's Rule: Approximations and Absurdity
Shin Sato. Informational requirements of social choice rules
Felix Brandt, Felix Fischer, Paul Harrenstein and Maximilian Mair. A Computational Analysis of the Tournament Equilibrium Set
Fuad Aleskerov, Daniel Karabekyan, Remzi Sanver and Vyacheslav Yakuba. Computing the Degree of Manipulability in the Case of Multiple Choice
Sébastien Konieczny and Ramon Pino Perez. Negotiation as Pointwise Merging
Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Ariel Procaccia and Jeffrey Rosenschein. Complexity of Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation Under Some Common Voting Rules
Edith Elkind and Yoram Bachrach. Divide and Conquer: False-Name Manipulations in Weighted Voting Games
Stéphane Airiau and Sandip Sen. A fair payoff distribution for myopic rational agents
Christian Klamler and Daniel Eckert. A geometric approach to judgment aggregation
Paul Harrenstein, Tamas Mahr and Mathijs de Weerdt. A Qualitative Vickrey Auction
Peter Biro and Eric McDermid. Three-sided stable matchings with cyclic preferences and the kidney exchange problem
Yann Chevaleyre, Jérôme Lang, Nicolas Maudet and Guillaume Ravilly-Abadie. Compiling the votes of a subelectorate
Eric Brelsford, Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Henning Schnoor and Ilka Schnoor. Approximability of Manipulating Elections
Vincenzo Auletta, Paolo Penna, Giuseppe Persiano and Carmine Ventre. Alternatives to Truthfulness are Hard to Recognize
Andreas Darmann, Christian Klamler and Ulrich Pferschy. Computing Spanning Trees in a Social Choice Context
Nadja Betzler, Michael Fellows, Jiong Guo, Rolf Niedermeier and Frances A. Rosamond. Computing Kemeny Rankings, Parameterized by the Average KT-Distance
Szymon Klarman. Judgment Aggregation as Maximization of Epistemic and Social Utility
Rolf Haenni. Aggregating Referee Scores: an Algebraic Approach
Davide Grossi. From Preferences to Judgments and Back
Dmitrii Pasechnik and Edith Elkind. Computing the nucleolus of weighted voting games
Gabor Erdelyi, Markus Nowak and Jörg Rothe. Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
Vincent Conitzer, Matthew Rognlie and Lirong Xia. Social Welfare Functions That Score Rankings and Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Thuc Vu, Alon Altman and Yoav Shoham. On the Agenda Control Problem for Knockout Tournaments
Franz Dietrich and Christian List. Majority voting on restricted domains: a summary