Computing the nucleolus of weighted voting games

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Workshop on Computational Social Choice, 2008

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- Coalitional games
- Solution concepts
- The least core and the nucleolus
- Sequential LPs for nucleolus
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 - Introduction and related work
 - Our main result



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Coalitional games

- Pair (I, ν) , where $I = \{1, ..., n\}$ set of *agents*, and $\nu : 2^{I} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$
 - Simple games: $\nu(S) \in \{0, 1\}$ for any $S \subset I$
 - $\nu(S) = 1$ if S is winning, otherwise S is losing
- Payoffs: $0 \le p \in \mathbb{R}^n$, normalised: $p(I) := \sum_{i \in I} p_i = 1$
- Want to find "most satisfying" payoffs solution concepts
- Want to be able to specify ν efficiently

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Weighted voting games (WVGs)

•
$$0 \le w \in \mathbb{R}^n$$
 – weights, $T > 0$ - threshold
• for $S \subset I$, we have $\nu(S) = \begin{cases} 1 : w(S) \ge T \\ 0 : w(S) < T \end{cases}$

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Solution concepts

Fairness-based, such as Shapley-Shubik index and Banzhaf index

• *Stability*-related, such as core, least core, and nucleolus. Maximising the chances for the grand coalition to stay together, treat each coalition as fairly as possible...

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
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The ε -core and the least core

Definition

The ε -core of a (I, ν) is the set of all p s.t. $p(S) \ge \nu(S) - \varepsilon$ for all $S \subseteq I$.

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The nucleolus and the deficits

– a particular way to define such an optimal payoff. We try to minimize the unhappiness of all the coalitions, not only the most unhappy ones.

- Let $d_S(p)$, for $S \subset I$ and $p \in \mathcal{L}_1$, be given by $p(S) = \nu(S) + d_S(p)$. This is the *deficit* of S w.r.t. p.
- Sort $S \subset I$ so that $d_{S_1}(p) \leq d_{S_2}(p) \dots$
- This defines a function
 - $\phi: \mathcal{L}_1 \to \{\text{non-decreasing vectors of length } 2^n\}$
- There will be the lexicographically maximal element *d** in φ(L₁).
- The (necessarily unique) p = φ⁻¹(d*) is the nucleolus of (l, ν)

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LP for the least core

Finding ε^1 —what we need for \mathcal{L}_1 —is a *linear program* (LP)

$$\min_{(\rho,\varepsilon)} \varepsilon \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \begin{cases} \sum_{i \in I} p_i = 1, \quad p_i \ge 0 \quad \text{for all } i = 1, \dots, n \\ \sum_{i \in S} p_i \ge \nu(S) - \varepsilon \text{ for all } S \subset I. \end{cases}$$
(1)

Let (p^1, ε^1) be an interior optimizer to (1). Let Σ^1 be the set of tight constraints for (p^1, ε^1) : for any $S \in \Sigma^1$ we have $p^1(S) = \nu(S) - \varepsilon^1$. Now we can specify the least core:

$$\mathcal{L}_{1} = \begin{cases} p(I) = 1, & p \ge 0\\ p(S) \ge \nu(S) \text{ for all } \Sigma^{1} \not\ni S \subset I\\ p(S) = \nu(S) - \varepsilon^{1} \text{ for all } S \in \Sigma^{1}. \end{cases}$$

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Sequential LPs for nucleolus

Now we can restrict attention to $\tilde{\mathcal{L}}_1$

$$\varepsilon^2 := \min_{(p,\varepsilon)\in \tilde{\mathcal{L}}_1} \varepsilon.$$
 (2)

Let (p^2, ε^2) be an interior optimizer to (2). Let Σ^2 be the set of tight constraints for (p^2, ε^2) : for any $S \in \Sigma^2$ we have $p^2(S) = \nu(S) - \varepsilon^2$. Now we can specify the "second" least core:

$$\mathcal{L}_{2} = \begin{cases} p(I) = 1, \quad p \ge 0\\ p(S) \ge \nu(S) \text{ for all } \Sigma^{1} \cup \Sigma^{2} \not\ni S \subset I\\ p(S) = \nu(S) - \varepsilon^{j} \text{ for all } S \in \Sigma^{j}, \quad j = 1, 2. \end{cases}$$

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Oracles for LPs and ellipsoid method

For an (I, ν) , these LPs will have $O(2^n)$ constraints, so one cannot, generally speaking, solve them in polynomial time, unless there exists a polynomial-time *separation oracle*

Definition

A separation oracle for a polytope $\mathcal{P} = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^n \mid \langle c_i, x \rangle \leq b_i, 1 \leq i \leq k\}$ is an algorithm that, given $y \in \mathbb{R}^n$, checks whether $y \in \mathcal{P}$, and if $y \notin \mathcal{P}$, returns an inequality $\langle c, x \rangle \leq b$ that is valid for \mathcal{P} , but $\langle c, y \rangle > b$.

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Known results.

Polynomial-time algorithms are known for the nucleolus for a number of classes of (I, ν) , typically of a combinatorial nature, e.g. flow games, matching games, etc.

For WVG (I, w, T), an algorithm to compute ε_1 is given in [EGGW07]. It runs in time polynomial in *n* and max_i{ w_1, \ldots, w_n }, so it is pseudo-polynomial – a truly polynomial-time procedure would depend rather on bitsizes, i.e. on log w_1, \ldots , log w_n . However, [EGGW07] shows that already computing ε_1 is NP-hard.

Note the parallel with the KNAPSACK problem. It is not a coincidence, as KNAPSACK with weights w is essentially the problem solved by the corresponding separation oracle.

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- The least core and the nucleolus
- Sequential LPs for nucleolus
- Solving sequential LPs for WVGs
 Introduction and related work
 - Our main result

3) Conclusion and future work

Introduction and related work Our main result

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Computing the nucleolus of WVGs

Theorem

For a WVG specified by integer weights w_1, \ldots, w_n and a quota *T*, there exists a procedure that computes its nucleolus in time polynomial in *n* and $W = \max_i w_i$.

Our algorithm solves the sequence of LPs using the ellipsoid method. The main technical difficulty is thus designing the separation oracles.

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An oracle for $\tilde{\mathcal{L}}_{j}$ in WVG

$$\tilde{\mathcal{L}}_{j} = \begin{cases} \nu(S) = (1 + \operatorname{sign}(w(S) - T))/2, & S \subset I \\ p(I) = 1, & p \ge 0, \varepsilon \le \varepsilon^{j-1} \\ p(S) = \nu(S) - \varepsilon^{k} \text{ for all } S \in \Sigma^{k}, & 1 \le k \le j-1 \\ p(S) \ge \nu(S) - \varepsilon \text{ for all } \cup_{k=1}^{j-1} \Sigma^{j} \not\ni S \subset I \end{cases}$$

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Introduction and related work Our main result

Naive attempt

We can try to formulate the conditions on $S \subset I$ to provide a separating hyperplane as the following 0 - 1 linear feasibility problem:

$$\sum_{i} p_i^{j-1} x_i > 1 - \varepsilon^{j-1}, \qquad (3)$$

$$\sum_{i} p_{i} x_{i} < 1 - \varepsilon, \qquad (4)$$

$$\sum_{i} w_i x_i \geq T, \quad x \in \{0,1\}^n.$$
 (5)

But this is NP-hard, in general - the bitsizes of p and p^{i-1} are too big! So off-the-shelf tools won't work here. In (3) we have certainly thrown away a lot of extra information available.

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Introduction and related work Our main result

A counting oracle

compute the top *j* distinct deficits $d_S(p) := p(S) - \nu(S) + \varepsilon$:

$$m^1 = \max\{d_S(p) \mid S \subseteq I\}$$

 $m^2 = \max\{d_S(p) \mid S \subseteq I, d_S(p) \neq m^1\}$

$$m^{j} = \max\{d_{\mathcal{S}}(p) \mid \mathcal{S} \subseteq I, d_{\mathcal{S}}(p) \neq m^{1}, \dots, m^{j-1}\}$$

as well as the numbers n^1, \ldots, n^j of coalitions that have deficits of m^1, \ldots, m^j , respectively:

$$n^k = |\{S \mid S \subseteq I, d_S(p) = m^k\}|, \quad k = 1, \dots, j.$$

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- Essentially the same procedure provides a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for the nucleolus of the k-vector WVGs, for a fixed k.
- The oracle developed can be used in a practical implementation of nucleolus computation for WVGs (this, due to poor practical performance of the ellipsoid method, ought to be e.g. a dual simplex cutting plane procedure).
- An approximation algorithm for the nucleolus of WVGs? (For ε₁, this was done in [EGGW07]). This will have to be an *additive* approximation, as it is NP-hard to decide whether the nucleolus payoff of a player is 0.

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