| Haris Aziz. Complexity of comparison of influence of players in simple games |
| Jose Apesteguia and Miguel A. Ballester. On the Complexity of Rationalizing Behavior |
| Abraham Othman and Tuomas Sandholm. The Cost and Windfall of Manipulability |
| Felix Fischer, Ariel Procaccia and Alex Samorodnitsky. On Voting Caterpillars: Approximating Maximum Degree in a Tournament by Binary Trees |
| Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind and Nick Jennings. Coalition Structures in Weighted Voting Games |
| Jan Broersen, Rosja Mastop, John-Jules Meyer and Paolo Turrini. A Deontic Logic for Socially Optimal Norms |
| Noam Hazon, Paul E. Dunne, Sarit Kraus and Michael Wooldridge. How to Rig Elections and Competitions |
| Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra and Jörg Rothe. Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Control |
| Kate Larson and Iyad Rahwan. Welfare properties of argumentation-based semantics |
| Rob LeGrand and Ron K. Cytron. Approval-rating systems that never reward insincerity |
| Arkadii Slinko and Shaun White. Extending the Theorem of Gibbard and Satterthwaite |
| Richard Booth and Thomas Meyer. Equilibria in Social Belief Removal |
| John McCabe-Dansted. Dodgson's Rule: Approximations and Absurdity |
| Shin Sato. Informational requirements of social choice rules |
| Felix Brandt, Felix Fischer, Paul Harrenstein and Maximilian Mair. A Computational Analysis of the Tournament Equilibrium Set |
| Fuad Aleskerov, Daniel Karabekyan, Remzi Sanver and Vyacheslav Yakuba. Computing the Degree of Manipulability in the Case of Multiple Choice |
| Sébastien Konieczny and Ramon Pino Perez. Negotiation as Pointwise Merging |
| Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Ariel Procaccia and Jeffrey Rosenschein. Complexity of Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation Under Some Common Voting Rules |
| Edith Elkind and Yoram Bachrach. Divide and Conquer: False-Name Manipulations in Weighted Voting Games |
| Stéphane Airiau and Sandip Sen. A fair payoff distribution for myopic rational agents |
| Christian Klamler and Daniel Eckert. A geometric approach to judgment aggregation |
| Paul Harrenstein, Tamas Mahr and Mathijs de Weerdt. A Qualitative Vickrey Auction |
| Peter Biro and Eric McDermid. Three-sided stable matchings with cyclic preferences and the kidney exchange problem |
| Yann Chevaleyre, Jérôme Lang, Nicolas Maudet and Guillaume Ravilly-Abadie. Compiling the votes of a subelectorate |
| Eric Brelsford, Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Henning Schnoor and Ilka Schnoor. Approximability of Manipulating Elections |
| Vincenzo Auletta, Paolo Penna, Giuseppe Persiano and Carmine Ventre. Alternatives to Truthfulness are Hard to Recognize |
| Andreas Darmann, Christian Klamler and Ulrich Pferschy. Computing Spanning Trees in a Social Choice Context |
| Nadja Betzler, Michael Fellows, Jiong Guo, Rolf Niedermeier and Frances A. Rosamond. Computing Kemeny Rankings, Parameterized by the Average KT-Distance |
| Szymon Klarman. Judgment Aggregation as Maximization of Epistemic and Social Utility |
| Rolf Haenni. Aggregating Referee Scores: an Algebraic Approach |
| Davide Grossi. From Preferences to Judgments and Back |
| Dmitrii Pasechnik and Edith Elkind. Computing the nucleolus of weighted voting games |
| Gabor Erdelyi, Markus Nowak and Jörg Rothe. Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control |
| Vincent Conitzer, Matthew Rognlie and Lirong Xia. Social Welfare Functions That Score Rankings and Maximum Likelihood Estimation |
| Thuc Vu, Alon Altman and Yoav Shoham. On the Agenda Control Problem for Knockout Tournaments |
| Franz Dietrich and Christian List. Majority voting on restricted domains: a summary |