The COMSOC-2016 program consists of 
three invited talks, 34 oral presentations and 21 poster presentations
of contributed papers, which have been selected amongst 70 submissions received
by the program committee.
 Each invited talk is 60 minutes long. Contributed talks have been 
allocated 20 minutes each, including questions and change-over to the next 
speaker. Accepted papers with poster presentation will be shown during all three days of the workshop.
There are two dedicated poster sessions of one hour each, and an additional open poster session on Friday.
 
|  9:20-9:30  Welcome    (Registration: from 9:00 onwards) | 
|  9:30-10:30  Invited Talk    
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|  10:30-11:00  Coffee Break | 
 11:00-12:00  Session 1: Multiwinner voting
- Computing Pareto Optimal Committees
 
      Haris Aziz, Jerome Lang and Jerome Monnot
 - Axiomatic Characterization of Committee Scoring Rules
 
     Piotr Skowron, Piotr Faliszewski and Arkadii Slinko
 - Committee Scoring Rules
 
     Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko and Nimrod Talmon
   | 
|  12:00-12:10  Short Break | 
 12:10-13:10  Session 2: Strategy-proofness and Fairness
-  Fairness in voting: the tale of Blotto's lieutenants
 
     Alessandra Casella, Jean-Francois Laslier and Antonin Macé
 - The Single-Peaked Domain Revisited: A Simple Global Characterization
 
     Clemens Puppe
 - Condorcet Domains and Median Graphs
 
 Clemens Puppe and Arkadii Slinko
   | 
|  13:10-14:30  Lunch | 
 14:30-15:30  Session 3: Preference structures 
- Structure in Dichotomous Preferences
 
     Edith Elkind and Martin Lackner
 - The one-dimensional Euclidean preferences: Finitely many forbidden substructures are not enough
 
     Jiehua Chen, Kirk Pruhs and Gerhard J. Woeginger
 -   Recognising Multidimensional Euclidean Preferences
 
     Dominik Peters
   | 
|  15:30-15:35 Presentation of the Handbook of Computational Social Choice (Felix Brandt)
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|  15:35-16:00  Afternoon Snack | 
|  16:00-17:00  Poster session 
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 17:00-18:20   Session 4: Complexity of voting and manipulation
-  Cycles and Intractability in Social Choice Theory
 
     William Zwicker
 -  Parameterized Complexity Results for the Kemeny Rule in Judgment Aggregation
 
     Ronald de Haan
 -  Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting
 
     Reshef Meir
 -   How Hard Is It to Control a Group?
 
     Yongjie Yang and Dinko Dimitrov
   | 
|  9:30-10:30  Invited Talk    
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|  10:30-11:00  Coffee Break | 
 11:00-12:00  Session 5: Automated reasoning and simulations
-  Proving the Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness via SMT Solving
 
     Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt and Christian Geist
 -  Automated Verification for Functional and Relational Properties of Voting Rules
 
     Bernhard Beckert, Thorsten Bormer, Michael Kirsten, Till Neuber and Mattias Ulbrich
 - Analyzing the Practical Relevance of Voting Paradoxes via Ehrhart Theory, Computer Simulations, and Empirical Data
 
     Felix Brandt, Christian Geist and Martin Strobel
   | 
|  12:00-12:10  Short Break | 
 12:10-13:10  Session 6: Resource allocation 1
- Optimal Reallocation under Additive and Ordinal Preferences
 
     Haris Aziz, Peter Biro, Jerome Lang, Julien Lesca and Jerome Monnot
 - Proportional Borda Allocations
 
     Andreas Darmann and Christian Klamler
 - On Truthful Mechanisms for Maximin Share Allocations
 
     Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas and Evangelos Markakis
   | 
|  13:10-14:30  Lunch | 
 14:30-15:30  Session 7: District voting and facility location
-  Misrepresentation in District Voting
 
     Yoram Bachrach, Omer Lev, Yoad Lewenberg and Yair Zick
 -   Divide and Conquer: Using Geographic Manipulation to Win District-Based Elections
 
     Yoad Lewenberg and Omer Lev
 -  On Voting and Facility Location
 
     Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Iddan Golomb
   | 
|  15:30-16:00  Afternoon Snack | 
|  16:00-17:00  Poster session 
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 17:00-18:00   Session 8: Applications: Peer grading, crowdsourcing, and power structures
-   How effective can simple ordinal peer grading be?
 
     Ioannis Caragiannis, George Krimpas and Alexandros Voudouris
 - Rules for Choosing Societal Tradeoffs
 
     Vincent Conitzer, Rupert Freeman, Markus Brill and Yuqian Li
 -  Ordinal power relations and social rankings
 
      Stefano Moretti and Meltem Ozturk
   | 
|  18:00-19:00   Business meeting
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|  20:30  Banquet at Moai   | 
|  9:30-10:30  Invited Talk    
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|  10:30-11:00  Coffee Break | 
|  11:00-12:00  Open poster session
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|  12:00-12:10  Short Break | 
 12:10-13:10  Session 9: Matching
-  Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites
 
     Katarina Cechlarova, Bettina Klaus and David Manlove
 -  Pareto optimal matchings with lower quotas
 
     Katarina Cechlarova and Tamás Fleiner
 - Natural Interviewing Equilibria for Stable Matching
 
     Joanna Drummond, Allan Borodin and Kate Larson
   | 
|  13:10-14:30  Lunch | 
 14:30-15:30  Session 10: Probabilistic approach 
- And the winner is ... Chevalier de Borda: Neural networks vote according to Borda's Rule
 
     Dávid Burka, Clemens Puppe, László Szepesváry and Attila Tasnadi
 -  Bayesian Estimators As Voting Rules
 
     Lirong Xia
 - Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
 
     Matias Nunez and Marcus Pivato
   | 
|  15:30-16:00  Afternoon Snack | 
 16:00-17:00  Session 11: Resource allocation 2
- Strategy-Proofness of Scoring Allocation Correspondences
 
     Nhan-Tam Nguyen, Dorothea Baumeister and Jorg Rothe
 -   Efficiency and Sequenceability in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods with Additive Preferences
 
     Sylvain Bouveret and Michel Lemaître
 - Object allocation problems under constraints
 
     Laurent Gourves, Carlos Martinhon and Jerome Monnot
   | 
|  17:00   Closing
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