The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets


Felix Brandt Felix Fischer Paul Harrenstein

University of Munich

First International Workshop on Computational Social Choice Amsterdam, 6-8 December 2006

Introduction

- Social choice functions:
 - m alternatives $A = \{a_1, \ldots, a_m\}$
 - *n* voters with preferences (\geq_1, \ldots, \geq_n) over *A*
 - Social choice function $f: f(\geq_1, \ldots, \geq_n) \in A$, for all (\geq_1, \ldots, \geq_n)
- Majority rule and the dominance relation (notation: a > b)
- Condorcet winner and Condorcet paradox
- Social choice sets: Smith Set, Schwartz Set, Stable Sets
- Relations between and issues concerning the computational complexity of choice sets



Tournaments, Dominance, and McGarvey's Theorem

Theorem (*McGarvey, 1953*) Any dominance relation can be realized by a particular preference profile, even if the individual preferences are linear.


- Assumption: set of preference relations includes linear preferences.
- A tournament is a complete dominance graph.
- Analyses usually restricted to tournaments (e.g., Laffont et.al. (1995), Hudry (2006)).
- · However: Ties do occur!
- Our approach: consider all anti-symmetric dominance graphs.



Smith Property and Smith set

Definition


- *X* has the *Smith property* if: x > y, for all $x \in X$ and all $y \notin X$.
- The Smith set is the smallest non-empty set with the Smith property.



Schwartz Property and Schwartz Set

Definition


- X has the Schwartz property if: $y \not\succ x$, for all $y \notin X$ and all $x \in X$.
- The Schwartz set is the union of the minimal (w.r.t. ⊆) non-empty sets with the Schwartz property.



Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets

Definition (Stable Sets) A set *U* is *stable* if both:

- $x \neq y$, for all $x, y \in U$ (internal stability),
- for all $y \notin U$, there is some $x \in U$ with x > y (external stability).



Remarks


- Originally from cooperative game theory.
- Relatively unknown as a solution concept in social choice.
- Stable sets need not exist or be unique.



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
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Some Properties of Choice Sets

- All sets contain the Condorcet winner as only element, if there is one.
- The Smith and Schwartz sets coincide in tournaments.
- In tournaments stable sets are equivalent to Condorcet winner.
- In general dominance graphs all sets may differ.
- The Schwartz set and every stable set are contained in the Smith set.
- Stable sets intersects with the Schwartz set.
- Also results for Copeland, Banks, and uncovered set.



Problems and Complexity Classes

Problems:

IS-CONDORCET is a the Condorcet winner?
IN-SCHWARTZ is a in the Schwartz set?
IN-SMITH, IN-STABLE analogous to IN-SCHWARTZ

Complexity Classes:

$$TC^0 \subseteq L \subseteq NL \subseteq P \subseteq NP$$

Complete problems:

TC⁰ majority of 1's in a bitstring

L undirected graph reachability

NL directed graph reachability

P Horn SAT

NP SAT



Observation IS-CONDORCET is TC^0 -complete, even in the two alternative tournament case.

Proof is straightforward. Majority gate required to construct dominance graph.

Theorem IN-SMITH is *TC*⁰-complete

Theorem IN-SCHWARTZ is NL-complete.

N.B.: For tournaments IN-SCHWARTZ=IN-SMITH and hence TC^0 -complete.

Theorem IN-STABLE is *NP*-complete, even if the existence of a stable set is guaranteed.

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IN-SMITH is *TC*⁰-Complete

Theorem IN-SMITH is TC^0 -complete.

Proof of hardness: IN-SMITH equivalent to IS-CONDORCET in the two alternative tournament case.

Proof of membership:

• **Observation**: if there is set *X* with Smith property of size *k* then for all *x*:

$$outdeg(x) \ge n - k$$
 iff $x \in X$.

- Check in parallel for k = 1, k = 2,... whether $\{x \in A \mid outdeg(x) \ge n k\}$ has Smith property.
- Check whether $a \in \{x \in A \mid outdeg(x) \ge n k\}$.
- This can be done in TC^0 (i.e., with constant depth threshold circuits).




Theorem IN-SCHWARTZ is *NL*-complete.

Proof of membership:

- Lemma: An alternative a is in the Schwartz set iff for all $b \in A$ with a path from b to a, there also is a path from a to b.
- Check for each $b \in A$ whether b reachable from a.
- If so, check if a is reachable from b.
- This can be done in NL.




Proof of hardness: Reduction from directed graph reachability.






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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


Theorem IN-STABLE is *NP*-complete, even if existence is guaranteed.

Proof of membership: Straightforward.


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
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
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




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





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Proof of membership: Straightforward.

Proof of hardness: Reduction from SAT.



(Based on a similar construction by Chvátal, 1973).



Dominance graph for $(x_1 \lor \bar{x}_2 \lor x_3 \lor \bar{x}_4) \land (x_4 \lor \bar{x}_5)$



Summary

- Various choice sets taking over the role of maximum in dominance graphs.
- The formal properties of choice sets differ for tournaments and general dominance graphs, also w.r.t. computational complexity.

	tournaments	general dominance graphs
IS-CONDORCET IN-SMITH	TC ⁰ -complete	TC ⁰ -complete
IN-SCHWARTZ		NL-complete
IN-STABLE		NP-complete

• Generic hardness results for social choice functions with the social choice in a particular social choice set.